The earlier volume in this series dealt with two religions of Indian origin, namely, Buddhism and Jainism. The Indian religious scene, however, is characterized by not only religions which originated in India but also by religions which entered India from outside India and made their home here. Thus religious life in India has been enlivened throughout its history by the presence of religions of foreign origin on its soil almost from the very time they came into existence. This volume covers (...) three such religions—Zoraoastrianism, Judaism, and Islam. In the case of Zoraostianism, even its very beginnings are intertwined with India, as Zoroastrianism reformed a preexisting religion which had strong links to the Vedic heritage of India. This relationship took on a new dimension when a Zoroastrian community, fearing persecution in Persia after its Arab conquest, sought shelter in western India and ultimately went on to produce India’s pioneering nationalist in the figure of Dadabhai Naoroji ( 1825-1917), also known as the Grand Old Man of India. Jews found refuge in south India after the destruction of the Temple by the Romans in 70 C.E. and have remained a part of the Indian religious scene since then, some even returning to Israel after it was founded in 1948. Islam arrived in Kerala as soon as it was founded and one of the earliest mosques in the history of Islam is found in India. Islam differs from the previously mentioned religions inasmuch as it went on to gain political hegemony over parts of the country for considerable periods of time, which meant that its impact on the religious life of the subcontinent has been greater compared to the other religions. It has also meant that Islam has existed in a religiously plural environment in India for a longer period than elsewhere in the world so that not only has Islam left a mark on India, India has also left its mark on it. Indeed all the three religions covered in this volume share this dual feature, that they have profoundly influenced Indian religious life and have also in turn been profoundly influenced by their presence in India. (shrink)

This case recounts the story of Rajat Gupta, a Goldman Sachs board member and seniorpartner emeritus of McKinsey & Co., who was accused by the government of giving critical nonpublicfinancial information to Raj Rajaratnam, Galleon Group founder, during the financial crisisof 2008. The information passed along to Rajaratnam was about a pending $5 billion investment byWarren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway in Goldman Sachs at a time when its stock had been faltering.The government alleged that based on this information, Rajaratnam purchased (...) a large number ofshares in the company and then sold them when the deal became public and Goldman’s stock rose.Rajaratnam purportedly made $18 million on these trades. (shrink)

Approaching comparison through attention to stories of gods rather than through explicit doctrines, and in particular to stories of gods in their infancy and childhood, is an arresting proposal in comparative theology. It was this unusual character which first drew my attention to Kristin Johnston Largen’s Baby Krishna, Infant Christ. Largen’s prose is fluid and clear, and the structure of the argument is also readily apparent. And thus the work held my attention and convinced me that it is deserving of (...) review here.An introduction and first chapter offer a description of and an apology for comparative theology. Part I, comprising chapters two and three, is focused on ‘Baby Krishna,’ first recounting some of the main stories of Krishna from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, before reflecting on the significance of those stories from the perspective of understanding how salvation is conceived and experienced in those Hindu traditions for which Krishna bhakti is crucial.The fourth and fifth chapters, .. (shrink)

The paper argues that intensional phenomena can be explained without appealing to "exotic" entities: one that don't exist, are merely possible, or are essentially abstract.

This concise, lively introduction to ancient Greek philosophy will help beginning students of both classical studies and philosophy get their bearings within an important yet complex array of names, schools, and ideas. The book illuminates the key period from the sixth to the third century BC, looking at the ideas that engaged the Greeks, in particular those of the Presocratics, the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the earliest Hellenistic philosophers. After chronologically mapping the main figures and their interconnections, _Introducing Greek (...) Philosophy_ focuses on themes especially relevant to philosophy today, including the origins of the universe and its mathematical structures; divine creation versus evolution and natural law; probability theory and the criteria for truth; political debates on democracy, citizen rights, and state obligations; and finally ethics, happiness, and the best way to live. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Frege on Function, Concept and Object Sinn (Sense) and Bedeutung (Reference) Identity Statements and Bearerless Names: Russell's View of Names as Associated with Descriptions Names and Communication Russell's Theory of Descriptions Indirect Discourse Conclusion.

I argue that there is no straightforward inference from there being fictional characters to any interesting form of realism. One reason is that “fictional” may be an intensional operator with wide scope, depriving the quantifier of its usual force. Another is that not all uses of “there are” are ontologically committing. A realist needs to show that neither of these phenomena are present in “There are fictional characters”. Other roads to realism run into difficulties when negotiating the role that presupposition (...) plays when we make intuitive evaluations of the truth or falsehood of sentences involving fiction, for we may presuppose things we do not believe. This means that a judgment of truth, implicitly relative to a presupposition we do not believe, can be sincerely made by someone who, from a more austere perspective, would regard the judgment as false. (shrink)

The development of a philosophical anthropology capable of doing justice to the "facts" of human action and agency is the leitmotif of this work whose central thesis is that "the act/agent relation is fundamental for an understanding of the self and must be kept distinct from the behavior/personality relation so often but mistakenly believed to exhaust the meaning of human life and conduct." To establish this thesis Browning offers first, a phenomenological analysis of human action, and then, a deduction of (...) the requisites of human agency entailed by his phenomenology of action. In the concluding section of the book, the ramifications of the act/agent analysis developed in the two previous sections for a comprehensive philosophical anthropology are tentatively explored. This is an ambitious and serious work, but one marred by a laconic presentation. A plethora of interesting ideas and distinctions are introduced, but too often without the detailed argument required to make them plausible or even fully intelligible.—V. R. M. (shrink)

This volume contains twenty-one selected articles and lectures written by the author over a period of some two decades. The remarkable range of McCulloch's abilities and interests is attested to by the diverse character of the contents, which range from neurophysiology to poetry and a scathing attack on Freud and psychoanalysis. Despite the dazzling diversity of topics treated, there is a readily discernible theme underlying all of McCulloch's work. It is represented explicitly in such papers as the classic "A Logical (...) Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity," a progenitor of more recent automata studies, and "Why the Mind is in the Head," McCulloch's contribution to the Hixon Symposium. This theme is, in the author's words, "the attempt to found a physiological theory of knowledge" or "experimental epistemology." Philosophers who take identity solutions to the mind-body problem seriously will applaud McCulloch's ingenious and sustained efforts to bridge the gap between conceptual analysis of mental concepts and painstaking scientific investigation of the physical "embodiments" of mental processes. Nevertheless, many philosophers will also be irritated by the way in which McCulloch tends to use mentalistic concepts. When nerve impulses are treated as atomic propositions and thinking is unhesitatingly attributed to a reverberating neural circuit, one cannot help but feel that genuine philosophical issues are in serious danger of being obscured rather than illumined.—V. R. M. (shrink)

I had a strange dream, or half-waking vision, not long ago. I found myself at the top of a mountain in the mist, feeling very pleased with myself, not just for having climbed the mountain, but for having achieved my life's ambition, to find a way of answering moral questions rationally. But as I was preening myself on this achievement, the mist began to clear, and I saw that I was surrounded on the mountain top by the graves of all (...) those other philosophers, great and small, who had had the same ambition, and thought they had achieved it. And I have come to see, reflecting on my dream, that, ever since, the hard-working philosophical worms have been nibbling away at their systems and showing that the achievement was an illusion. True, their skeletons, indigestible to worms, remained, and were surprisingly similar to one another. But I was led to think again about what one can, and what one cannot, achieve in this direction. (shrink)

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

[R. M. Sainsbury] Evans argued that most ordinary proper names were Russellian: to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no meaning. The first part of this paper addresses Evans's arguments, and finds them wanting. Evans also claimed that the logical form of some negative existential sentences involves 'really' (e.g. 'Hamlet didn't really exist'). One might be tempted by the view, even if one did not accept its Russellian motivation. However, I suggest that Evans gives (...) no adequate account of 'really', and I point to unclarities in Wiggins's similar, but distinct, attempt to use 'really' in the logical form of true negative existentials. /// [David Wiggins] Evans was not wrong (I maintain) to say that the senses of genuine proper names invoke and require objects. Names in fiction or hypothesis mimic such names. Pace Evans, Sainsbury and free logicians, proper names are scopeless. (Evans's 'Julius' is not a name.) Names create a presumption of existential generalization. In sentences such as 'Vulcan does not really exist', that presumption is bracketed. The sentence specifies by reference to story or report a concept identical with Vulcan and declares it be really uninstantiated. (The sentence, which partakes of play, is a kind of palimpsest.) It is explained why this second level view of 'exists' is to be preferred. (shrink)